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On the Continuity of Spatial Exclusion and Confinement 
in Twentieth Century United States 
 
© Bernard E. Harcourt 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 The incarceration explosion of the late twentieth century set off a storm of 
longitudinal research on the relationship between rates of imprisonment and 
crime, unemployment, education, and other social indicators. Those studies, 
however, are flawed because they fail to measure confinement properly. They rely 
on imprisonment data only, and ignore historical rates of mental hospitalization. 
With the exception of a discrete literature on the interdependence of the mental 
hospital and prison populations and some studies on explanations for the prison 
expansion, none of the empirical work related to the incarceration explosion—or 
for that matter, older research on the prison-crime and prison-unemployment 
relationships in the 1960s—takes proper account of mental hospitalization rates.  
 
 When the data on mental hospitalization are combined with the data on 
imprisonment for the period 1928 through 2000, the incarceration revolution of 
the late twentieth century barely reaches the level of institutionalization that the 
United States experienced at mid-century. The highest rate of aggregated 
institutionalization during the entire century occurred in 1955 when almost 640 
persons per 100,000 adults over the age 15 were institutionalized in asylums, 
mental hospitals, and state and federal prisons. In addition, the trend line for 
aggregated institutionalization reflects a mirror image of the national homicide 
rate during the same period. Using a Prais-Winsten regression model that corrects 
for autocorrelation in time-series data, and holding constant three leading 
structural covariates of homicide, this paper finds a large, statistically significant, 
and robust relationship between aggregated institutionalization and homicide.  
 
 These findings underscore, more than anything, how much 
institutionalization there was at mid-century.  The implications are both practical 
and theoretical. As a practical matter, empirical research that uses confinement as 
a value of interest should use an aggregated institutionalization rate that 
incorporates mental hospitalization. At a theoretical level, these findings suggest 
that it may be the continuity of confinement—and not just the incarceration 
explosion—that needs to be explored and explained.  
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On the Continuity of Spatial Exclusion and Confinement  
In Twentieth Century United States 
 
 
Bernard E. Harcourt1
 
 This paper contributes one simple idea to the now vast and exhaustive literature on the 
incarceration explosion in the United States that began in the late-twentieth century. Though 
simple, it is an idea that has been entirely overlooked in the quantitative analyses and legal 
research that use rates of imprisonment as an independent variable—in other words, in research 
that studies the effects of different levels of coercive social control on other social indicators. It is 
the story of the rise and fall of discrete institutions, but of the continuity of institutionalization—
a story that resonates well with the writings of Erving Goffman (Asylums 1961), Gerald Grob 
(The State and the Mentally Ill 1966), David Rothman (The Discovery of the Asylum 1971), and 
with Michel Foucault’s depiction, in Madness and Civilization (1961), of the continuity that 
marked the different stages of Western civilization—from the lazar houses for lepers on the 
outskirts of Medieval cities, to the Ships of Fools navigating down rivers of Renaissance Europe, 
to the establishment in the seventeenth century of the Hôpital Général in Paris, that enormous 
house of confinement for the poor, the unemployed, the homeless, the vagabond, the criminal, 
and the insane.  
 The simple idea is that there is a continuity of spatial exclusion and confinement in the 
United States from the high rates of mental hospitalization in the mid-1950s to the high rates of 
imprisonment at the turn of the twenty-first century, and that, as a result, when we measure 
confinement or coercive social control for purposes of longitudinal research on crime, 
unemployment, education, or any other social indicator, we should use an aggregated 
institutionalization rate that includes both mental hospitalization and prison rates.   
 With the marked exception of longitudinal research on the interdependence of the mental 
hospital and prison populations, as well as some empirical research into the causes of the prison 
 
1  Special thanks to Andrew Abbott for lengthy and always fascinating discussions of mental hospitals and other 
institutions; to Steven Levitt, Tracey Meares, John Monahan, Tom Miles, and Steve Messner for comments on the 
paper; to the participants at the Symposium on Punishment Law and Policy for comments and feedback, especially 
Rachel Barkow, Jeffrey Fagan, Dan Kahan, Kathleen O’Neill, Kevin Reitz, Jonathan Simon, Carol Steiker, and 
Jordan Steiker; and to Stephen Schacht at NORC for guidance on the statistical analysis and comments on the paper. 
For excellent research assistance, I thank Zac Callen, Ellen Fitzgerald, Sam Lim, and Dan Montgomery.  
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explosion (Steadman, Monahan, et al. 1984; Liska, Markowitz, et al. 1999; Raphael 2000; Pfaff 
2004), no published empirical research conceptualizes the level of confinement in society 
through the lens of institutionalization rather than simply incarceration. None of the longitudinal 
research that uses confinement as an independent variable—in other words, that studies the 
effects of various social indicators (including confinement) on crime, unemployment, education, 
or other independent variables—includes mental hospitalization in its measure of confinement. 
Moreover, none of the binary longitudinal studies on confinement—in other words, research that 
studies the specific relationship between confinement and unemployment, or confinement and 
crime, or confinement and any other non-mental health related indicator—uses a measure of 
coercive social control that includes rates of mental hospitalization. Even the most rigorous, 
recent analyses of the prison-crime relationship use only imprisonment data (see, e.g. Defina and 
Arvanites 2002; Levitt 1996 and 2004; Marvel and Moody 1994). Though a tremendous amount 
of empirical work has been done on long-term crime trends, structural covariates of homicide, 
unemployment, and the prison expansion, none of this literature conceptualizes confinement 
through the larger prism of institutionalization, and none of it aggregates mental hospitalization 
data with prison rates. 
 This is remarkable for at least two reasons. First, the empirical data on mental 
hospitalization reflect extraordinarily high rates of institutionalization at mid-century. Simply 
put, when the data on mental hospitalization rates are combined with the data on prison rates for 
the period 1928 through 2000, the incarceration revolution of the late twentieth century barely 
reaches the level of aggregated institutionalization that the United States experienced at mid 
century. The highest rate of aggregated institutionalization during the entire twentieth century 
occurred in 1955 when almost 640 persons per 100,000 adults over the age 15 were 
institutionalized in asylums, mental hospitals, and state and federal prisons. Throughout almost 
the entire period from 1938 to 1960, the United States population experienced rates of 
institutionalization in excess of 600 inmates per 100,000 adults. Figure 1 shows the aggregate 
rate of institutionalization in the United States for the period 1928 to 2000, as well as the 
disaggregated trend lines for mental hospitalization on the one hand and state and federal prisons 
on the other:  
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Institutionalization in the United States (per 100,000 adults)
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 Aggregating mental hospitalization and imprisonment rates into a combined 
institutionalization rate significantly changes the trend line for confinement over the twentieth 
century. We are used to thinking of confinement through the lens of incarceration only, and to 
referring to the period prior to the mid-1970s as one of “relative stability” followed by an 
exponential rise—and I include myself here (Harcourt 2001: 4; Harcourt 2006). As a literal 
matter, this is of course right. If all we are describing is the specific variable in our study and the 
source of the data, then indeed the observations are relatively stable over the five decades. But 
the truth is, what we generally are trying to capture when we use the variable, prison rate, is 
something about confinement, about coercive social control, about institutionalization. And from 
this larger perspective, the period before 1970—in fact, the entire twentieth century—reflects 
remarkable instability.  
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 Second, for anyone who has spent time looking at longitudinal data on homicide in the 
United States, the aggregated institutionalization trend from Figure 1 is shocking: it reflects a 
mirror image of national homicide rates. This is visually represented in the following figure, 
Figure 2, using vital statistics data from the National Center for Health Statistics: 
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 The relationship between institutionalization and homicide rates in Figure 2 is 
remarkable, at least at first glance. Later in this paper, I test and quantify the relationship, and 
find that, correcting for autocorrelation of the time-series data and holding constant the leading 
structural covariates of homicide (poverty, demographic change, and unemployment), the 
relationship is large, statistically significant, and robust. Naturally, the correlation does not begin 
to explain the relationship. These are aggregated national level time-series data and, as such, they 
provide weak power to rule out alternative explanations for the patterns observed in the data. But 
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what this does suggest is that we may need to revisit all of our empirical studies that use the 
imprisonment rate as a proxy for coercive social control.   
 The potential implications of aggregating mental hospital and prison data are wide 
ranging and particularly salient for sociological, criminological, and econometric research into 
the incarceration-crime relationship.2 Rethinking confinement through the lens of 
institutionalization would also significantly impact research in punishment theory, such as 
studies that have attempted to operationalize and test the central insights of the Frankfurt 
School—specifically, Georg Rusche and Otto Kirchheimer’s suggestion in Punishment and 
Social Structure that penal strategies are shaped by systems of economic production and fiscal 
policies. A review of that literature suggests that there is empirical plausibility to the Rusche-
Kirchheimer hypothesis (Chiricos and Delone 1992: 431). To date, though, the research has 
focused only on imprisonment rates. 
 For instance, in a study titled Unemployment, Imprisonment, and Social Structures of 
Accumulation: Historical Contingency in the Rusche-Kirchheimer Hypothesis, Raymond 
Michalowski and Susan Carlson refine the test of the Rusche-Kirchheimer hypothesis by 
periodizing their analyses. Drawing on recent theories about shifts in social structures of 
accumulation (“SSAs”) in the United States during the twentieth century, the authors break down 
the years between 1933 and 1992 into four periods: (1) a period of economic exploration from 
1933 to 1947 marked by high levels of structural unemployment, labor conflict, and worker 
displacement, that lead to the emergence of social institutions (welfare state policies and labor 
accords) that have come to be known as Fordist (1999:224); (2) a period of economic 
consolidation from 1948 to 1966 marked by increasing economic output, upward trends in real 
wages, and decreasing unemployment (1999:224); (3) a period of decay from 1967 to 1979 
marked by increasing unemployment, eroding labor accords, and the oil crisis of 1973 (1999: 
225); and (4) a period of renewed exploration from 1980 to 1992 marked by significant 
displacement of young men, a shift away from social-welfare strategies, and the growth of the 
service industry, that some have called the beginning of the post-Fordist period (1999: 226). 
Using imprisonment rates only, the authors find a weak, though statistically significant impact of 
 
2  Not only studies of incapacitation and deterrence, but also research that studies the influence of crime rates on 
incarceration rates. Much of this work uses data from the early 1970s (e.g. Ouimet and Tremblay 1996 (using inter 
alia 1972 data). Here too, aggregating mental hospitalization rates would have a significant effect. 
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unemployment on prison admissions during the first period of exploration (1999:237); and a 
strong impact of unemployment on prison admissions during the third period of decay 
(1999:238). The trouble is, both of those periods are marked by stability of incarceration, but by 
instability of institutionalization: using aggregated institutionalization data, the first period 
(exploration) is characterized by a dramatic increase in the institutionalized population, and the 
third period (decay) is marked by an exponential decrease in institutionalization.  
 Another area of research that would be significantly affected is studies of the relationship 
between education, incarceration, and crime (e.g., Lochner 2004; Jacobs and Lefgren 2003), 
which again tend to use imprisonment data only.  
 My purpose in this essay is not to prove an institutionalization-homicide relationship, nor 
to question the studies on the incarceration-unemployment relationship. Instead, my goal is to 
reconnect social theory to empirical research: to take seriously the social theory writings on the 
asylum from the 1960s and 1970s—and on the continuity of spatial exclusion and confinement—
and to allow those writings to inform our empirical research. To provoke us all—myself 
included—to rethink confinement through the lens of institutionalization.  
 This paper proceeds in three parts. Part I locates the central idea of the paper in the larger 
literature and reviews some of the empirical research surrounding the incarceration expansion. 
Part II presents the empirical data on aggregated institutionalization rates and offers preliminary 
quantitative findings on the institutionalization-homicide relationship. Part III then offers 
reflections on possible interpretations and directions for future research.     
 
PART I:  Asylums and Penitentiaries 
 
 Many have gestured at the continuity of spatial exclusion and confinement that marks 
both the asylum and the penitentiary. Erving Goffman’s essays on Asylums (1961) are a good 
place to start. Goffman locates the asylum within the space of what he calls “total institutions”—
a class of institutions that includes the prison, the jail, sanitaria and leprosaria, and almshouses 
for the poor and infirm, as well as the army barrack, boarding schools, and monasteries (1961: 4-
5). These total institutions, Goffman explains, are marked by a “basic split” between a group of 
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inmates removed from the outside world and a staff that is integrated with that outside world 
(1961: 7). Listen as Goffman introduces his topic: 
 
A total institution may be defined as a place of residence and work where a large number 
of like-situated individuals, cut off from the wider society for an appreciable period of 
time, together lead an enclosed, formally administered round of life. Prisons serve as a 
clear example, providing we appreciate that what is prison-like about prisons is found in 
institutions whose members have broken no laws. This volume deals with total 
institutions in general and one example, mental hospitals, in particular. (Goffman 
1961:xiii) 
 
It is the continuity—and discontinuities—between the different “total institutions” that Goffman 
explores in his work, tracing the contours of the asylum inmate’s world and the inmate’s relation 
to the supervisory staff, and in the process producing a manual on the structure of the self.  
 David Rothman, in The Discovery of the Asylum (1971), similarly explores total 
institutions, but from the perspective of social history. He too locates the asylum squarely in a 
shared space with the prison, the sanitarium, the orphanage, and the almshouse. The question 
Rothman poses is, “Why in the decades after 1820 did [Americans] all at once erect 
penitentiaries for the criminal, asylums for the insane, almshouses for the poor, orphan asylums 
for homeless children, and reformatories for delinquents?” (1971: xiii). It is this “revolution in 
social practice” that Rothman seeks to explore and explain—a revolution that encompasses 
institutionalization writ large. “Institutions,” Rothman observes, “became places of first resort, 
the preferred solution to the problems of poverty, crime, delinquency, and insanity.” Id. In 
remarkably Durkheimian fashion, Rothman’s answer turns on social and moral cohesion: on the 
perceived need to restore some form of social balance during a time of instability at the birth of 
the new republic (see especially 1971: xviii and 295). In this quest for stability and social 
cohesion, the invention of the penitentiary, the asylum, and the almshouse—as well as houses of 
refuge, reformatories, and orphan asylums—represented the ordering of spatial confinement 
necessary to appease apprehension of the unknown. It produced, again, a continuity of 
confinement.  
 In Madness and Civilization (1961), Michel Foucault documented the continuity from the 
lazar homes for lepers on the outskirts of villages in the Middle Ages to the all encompassing 
houses of confinement in the seventeenth century, to the birth of the asylum in the modern age. 
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“Leprosy disappeared, the leper vanished, or almost, from memory,” Foucault remarks; and yet, 
“these structures remained. Often, in these same places, the formulas of exclusion would be 
repeated, strangely similar two or three centuries later. Poor vagabonds, criminals, and ‘deranged 
minds’ would take the part played by the leper. . . With an altogether new meaning and in a very 
different culture, the forms would remain—essentially that major form of a rigorous division 
which is social exclusion but spiritual reintegration” (1965: 7).  
 Goffman’s “total institutions” were all reunited in the establishment in 1656 by Louis 
XIV of the Hôpital Général in Paris. Once an arsenal, a rest home for war veterans, and various 
hospitals—including both hospitals “la grande et la petite Pitié”—the new Hôpital Général 
would now serve as a house of confinement for the poor, the homeless, the unemployed, the 
prisoners, and the insane—those who sought assistance and those who were sent there by royal 
or judicial decree. And in the space of several months, one out of every hundred inhabitants of 
Paris would find themselves confined in these institutions (Foucault 1965: 38; 1972:59). This 
model of confinement would be extended across France and, in an edict dated June 16, 1676, 
Louis XIV would order the establishment of a “hospital general in each city of his kingdom” 
(1965: 41; 1972:62). Similar networks of houses of confinement spread through German-
speaking countries, England, Scotland, Ireland, and across Europe. 
 What characterized these houses of confinement was their indiscriminate nature: “the 
same walls could contain those condemned by common law, young men who disturbed their 
families’ peace or who squandered their goods, people without profession, and the insane” 
(1965:45; 1972: 66). “One-tenth of all the arrests made in Paris for the Hôpital Général concern 
‘the insane,’ ‘demented’ men, individuals of ‘wandering mind,’ and ‘persons who have become 
completely mad.’ Between these and the others, no sign of a differentiation. Judging from the 
registries, the same sensibility appears to collect them, the same gestures to set them apart” 
(1965: 65).  
 And what unified the category, Foucault suggested, was a new ethic of work and moral 
obligation as a reaction against idleness and economic turmoil—especially the problems of 
unemployment, the vagabond, the homeless, and the destitute (1965: 46). The classical age 
brought together the insane and the criminal, the poor and the unemployed, in one unitary 
category, a “complex unity” that assembled “a new sensibility to poverty and to the duties of 
 
1/28/2006 Confinement in the United States 10 
 
 
                                                
assistance, new forms of reaction to the economic problems of unemployment and idleness, a 
new ethic of work, and also the dream of a city where moral obligation was joined to civil law, 
within the authoritarian forms of constraint” (1965: 46). At the heart of it all was a conception of 
poverty as being the source of all disorder. The houses of confinement were an attempt to create 
order: the Hôpital Général was expressly established with the goal of preventing “mendicancy 
and idleness as the source of all disorders” (1965: 47), and it was the culmination of many 
initiatives to banish paupers from Paris—like the decree of 1606 that “ordered the beggars of 
Paris to be whipped in the public square, branded on the shoulder, shorn, and then driven from 
the city” (1965: 47). In the place of total exile, there came confinement: “the unemployed person 
was no longer driven away or punished; he was taken in charge, at the expense of the nation but 
at the cost of his individual liberty” (1965: 48). And the numbers were astounding, rising to 
between five and six thousand people of all ages—men, women, and children: “La Salpêtrière 
housed 1,460 women and small children; at La Pitié there were 98 boys, 897 girls between seven 
and seventeen, and 95 women; at Bicêtre, 1,615 adult men; at La Savonnerie, 305 boys between 
eight and thirteen; finally, Scipion lodged 530 pregnant women, nursing women, and very young 
children” (1965: 49).  
 It would take the age of reason—the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—to identify 
the category of the insane, and extract the madman from the houses of correction—to see the 
insane as curable, as subjects of medical knowledge. The post-Revolutionary period expressed 
outrage and indignation at the idea that the insane would be thrown in with the lot of criminals 
and paupers (1965:224). “The raving mad. . . are chained in dungeons beside criminals. What a 
monstrous association! The calm madmen are treated worse than malefactors” (1965: 221). And, 
through an intricate process, madness was separated—created as another category—within the 
realm of the unreason.3 “The undifferentiated unity of unreason had been broken. Madness was 
 
3  In Madness and Civilization, Foucault traces the shift to a number of factors, including the reaction of elite 
criminals, the need for industrialized labor, and the development of the medical personage—rather than 
humanitarian instinct. So, for instance, the outrage is portrayed as the reaction of the criminal nobility against being 
incarcerated with the insane. “The presence of the mad appears as an injustice; but for others,” Foucault wrote 
(1965:228). The complaints had been heard from the prisoners: “one man writes to Maurepas, indignant at being 
‘forced to mingle with madmen, some of whom are so violent that at every moment I risk suffering dangerous abuse 
from them’; another—the Abbé de Montcrif—makes the same complaint to Lieutenant Berryer: ‘This is the ninth 
month that I have been confined here in this dreadful place with fifteen or twenty raving madmen, pell-mell with 
epileptics’” (1965: 224). Also, insofar as the turn to industry called for more bodies, confinement of men who could 
be bettered became unreasonable: “confinement was a gross error, and an economic mistake” (1965: 232). Cure 
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individualized, strangely twinned with crime” (1965: 228). There was though a commonality 
they would share—the commonality of confinement: “between madness and confinement, a 
profound relation had been instituted, a link which was almost one of essence” (1965: 228). This 
is what gave birth to the asylum—“the happy age when madness was finally recognized and 
treated according to a truth to which we had too long remained blind” (1965: 241). The common 
thread running through Foucault’s account—as well as Goffman’s and others’—is precisely this 
continuity of spatial exclusion: “The asylum was substituted for the lazar house, in the 
geography of haunted places as in the landscape of the moral universe” (1965: 57).     
 An outpouring of critical work in the 1960s and 70s, from the Left and from the Right, 
portrayed the mental hospital as an inherently repressive institution, on par with the prison. 
Drawing on the writings of Thomas Szasz, The Myth of Mental Illness (1961), as well as on the 
work of Rothman, Foucault, and Ignatieff (1978), these critical writings contributed to the idea 
of a continuity of confinement (see generally Grob 1983:ix-x). From this perspective, mental 
illness was “an abstraction designed to rationalize the confinement of individuals who 
manifested disruptive and aberrant behavior” and the asylum’s primary function was to “confine 
social deviants and/or unproductive persons” (Grob 1983: ix-x). 
 
 Empirical Social Science Research 
 But little of the social theorizing made its way into the measurement of coercive social 
control for purposes of empirical research, data collection, and statistical analyses. The one 
exception, of course, involves studies of the interdependence of mental hospitalization and prison 
populations. This research specifically explores whether the deinstitutionalization of mental 
hospitals in the 1960s fed prison populations, contributing to the rise in incarceration in the 
following decades (see, e.g., Steadman, Monahan, et al. 1984; Liska, Markowitz, et al. 1999; 
Raphael 2000; Pfaff 2004). But other than this specific body of literature, the link between the 
asylum and the penitentiary has essentially been ignored.  
 
became important to return the insane to the labor force. Still others saw as their mission to impose a morality on the 
insane—to return them to the ethical standards of humanity (1965: 259). And there is also the development of the 
medical personage and medical knowledge. “With the new status of the medical personage, the deepest meaning of 
confinements is abolished: mental disease, with the meanings we now give it, is made possible” (1965: 270). “If the 
medical personage could isolate madness, it was not because he knew it, but because he mastered it, and what for 
positivism would be an image of objectivity was only the other side of this domination” (1965:272). 
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 This is the product, in part, of the balkanization of research on systems of social control 
(Markowitz et al. 1999). Criminologists and sociologists of punishment have turned most of their 
attention recently—and justifiably—to the massive prison build-up. Historians of mental health 
systems, in contrast, have had their own remarkable trend to explain: the massive 
deinstitutionalization of mental health patients (Gronfein 1985: 192). The focus of their research 
predominantly was on explaining the move to deinstitutionalization, much of it exploring 
alternative explanations to the humanitarian and outright deinstitutionalization policies.4 But the 
two research interests seem not to have intersected.    
 It is also, in part, an accident of history, in the sense that much of the longitudinal 
research into structural covariates of homicide and into the incarceration-crime relationship was 
conducted using pre-1980 data during a period of perceived stability of imprisonment—for 
instance, the important work of Alfred Blumstein on the stability of punishment hypothesis 
(Blumstein and Moitra 1979), research on the prison-crime nexus (e.g. Chiricos and Waldo 1970; 
Bowker 1981; McGuire and Sheehan 1983), the leading studies on covariates of homicide 
(reviewed in Land, McCall and Cohen 1990), and the research of the NRC’s Panel on Research 
on Deterrent and Incapacitative Effects (Blumstein, Cohen and Nagin 1979). The shock of the 
incarceration explosion in the 1980s and 1990s led most researchers to revise their earlier 
findings on the stability of punishment—including Blumstein (1995)—and triggered an 
outpouring of new research on the effect of incarceration on crime, this time using 1990s data 
(for a review of that extensive literature, see Spelman 2000). But the temporal disjuncture 
obscured the role of mental hospitalization: by 1995, the number of persons in mental hospitals 
was so relatively small, that the rate of mental hospitalization seemed insignificant.  
 It also reflects the wide gulf between critical social theory and quantitative research.  
Whatever the explanation, though, the result is striking: no published empirical research 
conceptualizes confinement through the lens of institutionalization. The criminology has failed to 
connect the prison to the asylum.  
 
4 William Gronfein shows, in his article Incentives and Intentions in Mental Health Policy (1985), that the structure 
of reimbursement policies that came into effect with the passage of the federal Medicaid program was the decisive 
factor in moving toward deinstitutionalization—and not, as many tend to think (Rose 1979; Aviram et al. 1976), the 
mere policy choice, nor the funding of community mental health centers (1985: 193). 
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 For instance, Alfred Blumstein, in his account of crime trends in the introduction to the 
edited volume The Crime Drop in America—generally perceived as an authoritative compilation 
on recent crime trends—never addresses aggregated institutionalization. With regard to the sharp 
increase in crime in the 1960s, Blumstein hits on all the usual suspects—the baby-boom 
generation, political legitimacy, economics—and includes later the usual explanations for the 
crime drop—changing drug use patterns, decreased gun violence, New York style policing, 
federal COPS program, increased incarceration. Notably absent in all of this, though, is the 
relationship between mental health and prison populations. It is simply nowhere in the analysis. 
Here, then, are the major causes of the trends from the 1960s to 1990s, according to Blumstein: 
 
The marked growth in violence between 1965 and the early 1970s may have been, at least 
in part, a result of the decline in perceived legitimacy of American social and 
governmental authority during this turbulent period, which contained the civil rights 
movement and the strident opposition to the war in Vietnam. The continuing uptrend 
from 1970 to 1980 and the decline to 1985 are largely attributable to the movement of the 
baby-boom generation into and then out of the high-crime ages of the late teens and early 
twenties; this is reflected in the general stability of violence rates within individual ages 
during that period. The rise following the 1985 trough should almost certainly be laid at 
the crack (smokable cocaine) epidemic and the contagion of violence spawned by its 
markets, which became a major factor in the urban problems of the late 1980s. The 
decline in the 1990s is a much more complicated story, which involves the numerous 
factors addressed in the subsequent chapters of this volume. (Blumstein and Wallman 
2000b:4) 
  
Those chapters cover gun violence, drug markets, policing practices, demographics and prison 
population expansion—but do not mention anywhere the mental health nexus. 
 This is also true of the literature that focuses exclusively on the incarceration-crime 
relationship. When addressing the role of prison populations, for example, Blumstein refers to 
the period from 1925 to 1975 as “a fifty-year period of impressive stability.” Blumstein 
discounts the role of incarceration as too “simplistic,” observing that, “After all, in the 1980s, 
during the period of the most prodigious growth in imprisonment, violence was increasing most 
markedly” (Blumstein and Wallman 2000b: 5-6). (Incidentally, neither of these statements is 
correct if we use an aggregated institutionalization measure).  
 More recently, Steven Levitt, in his review of the empirical literature on crime, 
Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four Factors that Explain the Decline and Six that 
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Do Not, identifies the prison population build-up as one of the four factors that explains the 
crime drop of the 1990s. Levitt estimates that the increased prison population over the 1990s 
accounted for a 12 percent reduction of homicide and violent crime, and an 8 percent reduction 
in property crime—for a total of about one-third of the overall drop in crime in the 1990s (Levitt 
2004: 178-79).  
 When Levitt extends his analysis to discuss the period 1973—1991, however, he sticks to 
the prison population exclusively, and does not even consider the contribution of the declining 
mental hospital population. For this reason, Levitt is surprised that the drop in crime did not start 
sooner. Regarding the period 1973—1991, Levitt writes:  
 
The one factor that dominates all others in terms of predicted impact on crime in this 
earlier [1973—1991] period is the growth in the prison population. Between 1973 and 
1991, the incarceration rate more than tripled, rising from 96 to 313 inmates per 100,000 
residents. By my estimates, that should have reduced violent crime and homicide by over 
30 percent and property crime by more than 20 percent. Note that this predicted impact of 
incarceration is much larger than for the latter [1990s] period. (Levitt 2004:184)  
 
 Based on prison data alone, Levitt is left with a significant gap between projected and 
actual crime rates for the period 1973—1990.  “In contrast to the 1990s, the actual crime 
experience in the 1973—1991 period is not well explained by the set of factors analyzed in this 
paper. There appears to be a substantial unexplained rise in crime over the period 1973—1991” 
(Levitt 2004; 186). Levitt finds this surprising given the important effect of incarceration in the 
1990s.  “In the light of the estimates linking increased incarceration to lower crime, it is perhaps 
surprising that the rising prison population of the 1980s did not induce a commensurate decline 
in crime in that period” (Levitt 2004: 179 n.7). 
 Levitt concludes: “The real puzzle that stands unanswered, I argue, is why crime rates did 
not start falling earlier” (2004: 164). “The real puzzle in my opinion, therefore, is not why crime 
fell in the 1990s, but why it did not start falling sooner” (Levitt 2004: 186). The missing piece of 
that puzzle, though, may well be mental hospitalizations—which, if included in the measure of 
confinement, would significantly alter the trend from 1973 to 1990. I discuss this further in Part 
II. If the value of interest is coercive social control, then imprisonment may not capture it all.  
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PART II:   Measuring Confinement and Exploring Some Implications  
 
 In this part, I turn to the empirical. I present data on the aggregated institutionalization 
rate for the United States, and explore the relationship between that measure of confinement and 
homicide rates.   
 
A. Aggregating Mental Hospital and Prison Data  
 The first task, a simple one, is to aggregate time-series data on the population of mental 
institutions and prisons—to create an aggregated institutionalization rate. In order to construct 
such a measure, I draw first on data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics for the number of 
prisoners under the jurisdiction of state and federal prisons from 1925 to 2004. For data on 
mental health populations, I draw on several different sources, including the U.S. Department of 
Commerce publication Patients in Mental Institutions, the Center for Mental Health Services’ 
Mental Health report, Gerald Grob’s From Asylum to Community (1991), and an article by 
Howard Goldman and his colleagues (1983). The resulting data set on mental health populations 
is nevertheless still missing 17 values over the 72 year period from 1928 to 2000, and so I have 
linearly interpolated the missing observations. In order to compute the rate of institutionalization 
per 100,000 adults over 15, I use general population data from the U.S. Census Bureau, Current 
Population Reports.  
 Because there are no reliable statistics on jail populations—in most cases, no data at all—
for the period before 1970, I have not included jail population data in the aggregated 
institutionalization numbers. In Appendix 1, I discuss jail data and replicate my models using the 
best available jail data. The results essentially do not change. But because the data on jail 
populations is so weak, I have not included them in the body of this essay.  
 The resulting time-series for the rate of aggregated institutionalization, as compared to 
the rate of incarceration in state and federal prisons, is represented in Figure 3 below:  
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 As Figure 3 demonstrates, the trend for aggregated institutionalization for the period 
1928 to 1980 differs significantly from the trend for incarceration alone over that period.   
 
 B. Exploring the Relationship between Institutionalization and Homicide Rates
 Anyone who has spent time looking at the homicide trends for the twentieth century will 
immediately recognize that the aggregated institutionalization rate from Figure 3 is an inverted 
plot—or mirror image—of the homicide trend line during the twentieth century. This is visually 
represented earlier in Figure 2, which I reproduce again here. Figure 2 draws its homicide date 
from the National Center for Health Statistics’ Vital Statistics of the United States:  
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 The correlation between the aggregated institutionalization and homicide rates is 
remarkably high: - 0.78. This is reflected in the following scatterplot, Figure 4, which plots the 
observations for each year between 1928 and 2000 (holding constant, as I discuss in a moment, 
unemployment and youth demographic change): 
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 (i) Prais-Winsten Regression Model 
 The relevant data here involve time series, and as a result are highly autocorrelated—the 
value in the time series at any one time depends heavily on the value in the preceding time(s). In 
order to adjust for autocorrelation, I employ a Prais-Winsten regression model with an 
autocorrelation adjustment of one time lag. The Prais-Winsten model essentially eliminates most 
of the autocorrelation (which is measured on a scale from 0 to 4 by the Durbin-Watson statistic, 
0 being highly positively interrelated data, 2 showing no autocorrelation, and 4 being highly 
negatively interrelated data). In addition, I compare the results I obtain against a Cochrane-
Orcutt regression model, which was an earlier method intended to achieve the same result. These 
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are straightforward models used by many researchers in the study of time-series data. Apart from 
the adjustment for autocorrelation, the regression model is simple: the aggregate homicide rate 
serves as the dependant variable, and the rate of institutionalization and other control variables 
are the regressors.  
 The control variables that I employ consist of three leading structural covariates for 
homicide: (1) the unemployment rate, (2) the changing age structure of the United States, and (3) 
the poverty rate. I run several models that take account of each individually, as well as the 
combined effect of these other indicators. A word about each of the three controls.   
 
  (a) Unemployment
 A tremendous amount of research has been conducted on the relationship between rates 
of crime and unemployment. At the theoretical level, a range of theories of action (from rational 
action theory, to strain and conflict theories) intuitively suggest that being unemployed may 
increase the motivation for crime (Carlson and Michalowski 1997: 209-210; Votey 1991: 128-
130). On the other hand, as Cantor and Land (1985) suggest, increased unemployment may also 
decrease the opportunity for criminal activity by reducing crime targets (employed people with 
money circulating in the neighborhood) (1985: 320-321).  
 The empirical research on the unemployment-crime nexus has been mixed and 
inconsistent, and, as a result, different schools of thought have developed on the salience of 
unemployment. Some, such as James Q. Wilson and James Alan Fox, discount the relationship, 
arguing that unemployment has little or no effect on crime rates (Wilson and Herrnstein 
1985:328; Fox 1978:29 (“The absence of an impact of the unemployment rate on the rate of 
crime appears at this time to be unequivocal”). Others, however, are less sure.  
 In a thorough review of the research literature, Rates of Crime and Unemployment: An 
Analysis of Aggregate Research Evidence, Theodore G. Chiricos analyzes the findings from 63 
studies containing 288 estimates of the crime-unemployment relationship, and concludes that 
there is a conditional relationship.5 Chiricos summarizes his findings: “for all crimes combined, 
                                                 
5  Three other earlier and less exhaustive reviews of the literature include Gillespie 1978 (reviewing 21 studies and 
finding a modest conditional relationship); Long and Witte 1981 (reviewing 16 studies involving unemployment and 
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the U-C relationship is three times more likely to be positive than negative (75/25 percent) and 
more than 15 times as likely to be significant/positive as significant/negative (31/2 percent). 
More meaningful, of course, are comparisons of U-C findings for specific types of crime. Table 
1 reveals that property crimes are more likely than violent crimes to produce positive results 
(85/64 percent) and significant/positive results (40/22 percent)” (Chiricos 1987: 192).  
 One of the main difficulties in studying the unemployment-crime nexus concerns 
measurement. The official rate of unemployment reported by governmental agencies typically 
includes only those persons who have been looking for work during the past month or months, 
but does not include persons who have given up their job search or have never looked for work. 
The latter are not considered to be within the labor force, and therefore are not considered 
unemployed (Chiricos 1987: 187 n.1). Naturally, this complicates matters significantly and 
suggests that official unemployment data may only work as a proxy for the condition of the labor 
force.  
 Because of the basic structure of my institutionalization data, there are few choices to be 
made regarding the unemployment data: we are dealing here with national data collected 
annually that covers the whole adult population. It turns out that this is not the method of 
analysis that produces the most highly consistent positive results in the unemployment context. 
In fact, this format is possibly the least favorable to the unemployment explanation: national 
level data show less consistently strong results than sub-national, violent crime is less strong than 
property crime, and long-term data is less strong than more recent data since the 1970s. 
Nevertheless, it is still important to factor in the effect of unemployment.  
 The measure I have chosen is the official unemployment rate reported by the U.S. Census 
and Department of Labor, which consists of the percentage of the civilian labor force that is 
unemployed, in thousands of persons 16 years old and over (prior to 1947, 14 years old and 
over), annual averages. For these data, I have drawn on the U.S. Census Bureau’s Historical 
Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970, for the period 1925—1970; and on data 
from the U.S. Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics for the period 1940-2004.  
 
finding modest conditional relationship); and Freeman 1983 (reviewing 18 studies and concluding that the 
relationship is modest and insufficient to explain upward trend in crime).  
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  (b) Demographics
 Another privileged explanation for long-term crime trends is the demographic-change 
hypothesis (see generally Fox 2000). The central intuition here is that variations in the 
composition of the population consisting of higher offending subgroups (such as 15 to 24 year 
old males) will have significant effects on the overall societal crime rate. From this 
compositional effects perspective, the three central axes of demographic concern are age, gender, 
and race. This flows from research that consistently shows that, at the individual level, “young 
people, males, and members of disadvantaged minorities are at comparatively high risk of 
becoming offenders and victims, at least with respect to the common ‘street’ crimes” (South and 
Messner 2000: 84).  
 A lot of research consistently attributes a large portion of the rise in crime during the 
1960s to the post-World War II baby boom which spanned the period 1946—1964 and produced 
a large number of high-risk persons aged 14 to 24 during the 1960s and 1970s (Blumstein and 
Nagin 1975; Laub 1983). There is debate, though, over the extent of the influence—as well as 
over how to interpret the results. Lawrence Cohen and Kenneth Land (1987) studied the 
relationship between the proportion of the population between 15 and 24 and variations in 
homicide and auto theft rates, and found a highly significant statistical relationship accounting 
for a substantial fraction of the change. In contrast, Steven Levitt conducted a study published in 
1999 titled The Limited Role of Changing Age Structure in Explaining Aggregate Crime Rates, 
and found that “the changing age distribution can explain only 10—20% of the dramatic rise in 
crime observed between 1960 and 1980” (Levitt 1999: 582). Levitt characterizes this as “a 
limited impact” (1999: 581). James Alan Fox and Alex Piquero (2003: 354) contend that about 
10 percent of the drop in crime in the 1990s was due to changing demographics and refer to this 
as “deadly demographics.” So the estimates and especially the interpretations vary significantly.   
 Here, too, there are different methods and choices in analyzing the demographic change 
hypothesis. The simplest approach is to regress the crime rates using demographic and other 
variables as regressors. In a review of 90 such studies, Thomas Marvell and Carlisle Moody 
(1991) find that only a small number find significant relationships. Again, however, given my 
institutionalization and homicide data, this is the only feasible approach here. Other approaches 
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include computing and comparing hypothetical rates of disaggregated group offending based on 
different population compositions (Levitt 1999).  
 The population data I use are drawn from the United States Census Bureau, Current 
Population Reports. Based on the data from those reports, I calculate the percentage of the total 
population represented by 15 to 24 year olds. A couple of caveats regarding the data: first, 
beginning in 1959, the populations of Alaska and Hawaii are included in the data, resulting in a 
750,000 person increase in the population (or 4.2%) that year. Also, the population estimates are 
all July estimates. Since there is going to be a slight time discrepancy, I have decided to lag this 
variable: in the statistical analysis, I use July 1927 population data in the regression to represent 
Dec 31, 1927 population. Finally, the population estimates for the period 1940 to 1979 include 
Armed Forces overseas, whereas the earlier and later periods do not. Naturally, this will have a 
slight distortion on the analysis, since it increases the population between the ages of 15 and 24 
for the period 1940 to 1979. The total number of 15 to 24 year olds, though, is so large (24 
million and 42.5 million respectively for 1940 and 1979) that the distortion is barely noticeable.  
 
  ( c) Poverty
 The third and last control variable in the models is poverty rates. In their seminal study, 
Structural Covariates of Homicide Rates: Are There Any Invariances Across Time and Social 
Space (1990), Kenneth Land, Patricia McCall, and Lawrence Cohen review twenty-one of the 
leading homicide studies and find that “by far, the strongest and most invariant effect is due to 
the resource-deprivation/affluence index; consistently across the four decennial census periods, 
cities, metropolitan areas, or states that are more deprived have higher homicide rates, and those 
that are more affluent have lower rates.” The trick again, however, is measuring poverty. The 
most widely used method is to rely on the official Census count of the percentage of households 
(families) below the poverty line. Since this is often highly correlated with other indicators of 
socio-economic status, some researchers will create an index for resource deprivation. However, 
in order to avoid biases in the construction of the index, I use the official poverty rate directly 
from the U.S. Census Bureau. The rates are only available from 1959 onwards, when the poverty 
line was first measured—so the regressions including this variable use a smaller number of 
observations (N = 42, rather than 73 as in all the other regressions).   
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 There are, of course, other popular explanations for major recent crime trends, but they 
do not tend to explain both the earlier increase in crime in the 1960s and the drop in 1990s. So, 
for instance, many point to the change in street drug markets during the 1990s and the decline of 
crack cocaine consumption as a leading explanation for the sharp drop in crime in the 1990s 
(Johnson, Golub and Dunlap 2000; Levitt 2004). Others point to the dispersion of activities away 
from the family and households in the period following World War II (Cohen and Felson 1979: 
604—605). And then, of course, there is the abortion hypothesis (Donohue and Levitt 2001). My 
models do not take account of these other possible explanations.   
 
 (ii) Findings 
 Table 1 shows that, regardless of the model specification, the aggregated 
institutionalization rate has a statistically significant correlation with the homicide rate, and that 
the contribution of institutionalization is far more important than that of other statistically 
significant control variables. So, for instance, looking at Model 4, which holds constant 
unemployment and demographic changes, institutionalization is at least two times more 
influential than unemployment (with a beta of -.876 versus .402 for unemployment). The Prais-
Winsten coefficient of -1.119 for institutionalization in Model 4 suggests that an increase in 
institutionalization of 1 per 1,000 adults is likely to translate into a reduction in the homicide rate 
of 1.119 per 100,000—with a 95 % confidence level ranging from -1.74 to -0.5.  
 Institutionalization remains robust regardless of model specification. In all but one 
case, it is statistically significant at the .001 level (and that one case is significant at the .002 
level), and, broadly speaking, is in the same range of influence. This is not entirely surprisingly 
because, in this case, the two trends—aggregated institutionalization and homicide rates—are 
practically mirror images and so highly correlated. As a result, regardless of the model, the result 
is likely going to be statistically significant.   
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Table 1 
 
The Effect of Aggregating Institutionalization on the Incarceration-Crime Nexus: 
Prais-Winsten Autocorrelation Adjustment at Lag 1 (AR1) Regression Results 
 
Dependent variable = Homicide Rates, 1928—2000 
 
Explanatory 
variables: 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 
Institutionalization: 
 
Prais coefficient 
Standard error 
P value 
OLS beta 
 
 
 
 
-1.085*** 
(.264) 
0.000 
 
 
 
 
-1.107*** 
(.251) 
0.000 
-.78 
 
 
 
 
-1.067*** 
(.327) 
0.002 
-.78 
 
 
 
-1.119*** 
(.309) 
0.001 
-.876 
 
 
 
-1.312*** 
(.347) 
0.001 
-.502 
 
 
 
-1.723*** 
(.44) 
0.000 
-.911 
 
Unemployment: 
 
Prais coefficient 
Standard error 
P value 
OLS beta 
 
  
 
 
.051** 
(.025) 
0.042 
.31 
  
 
 
.051** 
(.025) 
0.043 
.402 
  
 
 
.072 
(.102) 
0.484 
.12 
 
Proportion 15 - 24: 
 
Prais coefficient 
Standard error 
P value 
OLS beta 
  
   
 
 
0.014 
(.149) 
0.924 
-.009 
 
 
 
-.01 
(.14) 
0.946 
-.219 
  
 
 
-.4 
(.196) 
0.049 
-.58 
Poverty: 
 
Prais coefficient 
Standard error 
P value 
OLS beta 
 
 
     
 
.046 
(.102) 
0.654 
-.417 
 
 
-.081 
(.114) 
0.482 
-.364 
Durbin-Watson 
statistic pre-Prais-
Winsten 
0.1319 0.186 0.1319 0.235 0.213 0.36 
Durbin-Watson 
statistic post-Prais-
Winsten 
1.3278 1.4678 1.3244 1.47 1.051 1.156 
OLS R-squared 0.609 0.706 0.609 0.736 0.647 0.832 
N 73 73 73 73 42 42 
* = statistically significant at 10 percent cutoff. ** = 5 percent cutoff. *** = 1 percent cutoff. 
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 The same cannot be said, though, of the relationship between the prison rate alone 
(excluding mental health populations) and the national homicide rate.  Table 2 summarizes the 
results of Prais-Winsten regressions using similar model specifications. As Table 2 demonstrates, 
the initial statistical relationship between prison and homicide rates vanishes pretty quickly as 
soon as other control variables, such as demographic change and poverty rates, are included in 
the models.  It is fair to say, from Table 2, that there is no robust relationship between the long 
term trends when prison rates, rather than aggregated institutionalization rates, are used.      
 Overall, the analyses suggest that including mental health data in the rate of 
institutionalization—rather than using prison rates only—is likely to have significant effects on 
the study of the relationship in the United States between confinement and crime during the 
twentieth century. Although it is tempting to discuss incapacitation here, far more research is 
necessary before we can begin to evaluate possible explanations for the relationship.   
 One additional comment: a problem with the analysis here is that there may be 
simultaneity bias. The relationship between crime and institutionalization is likely to be two-
way: although increased institutionalization is likely to decrease crime rates through 
incapacitation, increased crime is also likely to increase institutionalization through convictions 
and sentencing. As a result, the incapacitation effect of institutionalization on crime is probably 
diminished and the statistical estimates are likely to understate the effect—as Levitt suggests, 
“perhaps dramatically” (Levitt 1996: 322). But the effect of this bias, if there is one, would only 
be to underestimate the effect of aggregated institutionalization on crime, and that would only 
increase the effect of aggregated institutionalization on homicide.  
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Table 2 
 
Using Prison Rates Only in Studying the Incarceration-Crime Nexus: 
Prais-Winsten Autocorrelation Adjustment at Lag 1 (AR1) Regression Results 
 
Dependent variable = Homicide Rates, 1928—2000 
 
Explanatory 
variables: 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 
Prison Rate: 
 
Prais coefficient 
Standard error 
P value 
 
 
 
-.0073* 
(.004) 
0.066 
 
 
 
 
-.009** 
(.004) 
0.033 
 
 
 
-.004 
(.004) 
0.375 
 
 
 
-.006 
(.005) 
0.210 
 
 
 
-.006 
(.004) 
0.144 
 
 
 
-.005 
(.006) 
0.390 
 
Unemployment: 
 
Prais coefficient 
Standard error 
P value 
 
  
 
 
.053** 
(.026) 
0.048 
  
 
 
.049* 
(.026) 
0.064 
  
 
 
.158 
(.123) 
0.206 
 
Proportion 15 - 24: 
 
Prais coefficient 
Standard error 
P value 
  
   
 
 
.225 
(.171) 
0.191 
 
 
 
 
.191 
(.169) 
0.263 
  
 
 
.05 
(.316) 
0.876 
Poverty: 
 
Prais coefficient 
Standard error 
P value 
 
 
     
 
-.086 
(.109) 
0.437 
 
 
-.196 
(.182) 
0.288 
Durbin-Watson 
statistic pre-Prais-
Winsten 
0.0669 0.0885 0.1385 0.136 0.194 0.612 
Durbin-Watson 
statistic post-Prais-
Winsten 
1.109 1.221 1.127 1.229 0.947 0.992 
OLS R-squared 0.0495 0.174 0.508 0.511 0.472 0.81 
N 73 73 73 73 42 42 
* = statistically significant at 10 percent cutoff. ** = 5 percent cutoff. *** = 1 percent cutoff. 
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 (iii) Estimating the Effects 
 
 Despite possible simultaneity bias, the influence of aggregated institutionalization on the 
homicide rate is large and robust. Based on the six models, we can estimate (using the 95 percent 
confidence intervals) that the effect may be somewhere between a low of -0.415 and a high of -
2.014. This means that a one person increase in the rate of aggregated institutionalization per 
1,000 adults (or an increase of 100 per 100,000) is associated with a decrease in the homicide 
rate of between 0.4 and 2 persons per 100,000 adults—in a universe where the homicide rates 
have varied between 4.5 and 10.7, with a mean of 7.4 over the period 1928 to 2000.  A summary 
of the 95 percent confidence intervals for the six models from Table 1 follows: 
 
 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
High -1.612 -1.608 -1.072 -1.736 -2.014 -2.614 
Low -0.559 -0.605 -0.415 -0.502 -0.609 -0.831 
 
 
 
 Another way to estimate the possible effect is to go back to Steve Levitt’s 2004 review of 
crime trends in the Journal of Economic Perspectives.  Recall that Levitt finds, based on his best 
estimates, that the elasticity of crime with respect to the prison population is -0.30 for homicide 
and violent crime and -0.20 for property crime (2004: 178).  This leads Levitt to the following 
estimates: 
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Incarceration Rate 
 
 
Homicide 
 
Violent Crime 
 
Property Crime 
 1991 2001 Change    
 
1990s 
 
 
 
313 
 
470 
 
+50.2%
 
– 12% 
 
– 12% 
 
– 8% 
 1973 1991 Change    
 
1973—1991 
 
 
 
96 
 
313 
 
+226% 
 
– 35% 
 
– 35% 
 
– 24% 
 
 
 
 Recall also that Levitt’s estimates for homicide for the period 1973—1991 are off by a 
net 25 percent. Levitt’s total estimated effect on homicide from his 10 factors is -20 percent, but 
the actual change in UCR reported homicides is up 5 percent. This leads Levitt to conclude that 
“There appears to be a substantial unexplained rise in crime over the period 1973—1991” (Levitt 
2004: 186). 
 The unexplained difference vanishes, however, if we include mental hospitalization in the 
aggregated institutionalization rate: the increase in confinement from 1973 to 1991 would only 
have been 152 per 100,000, or up 52 percent, from a rate of 291 in 1973 to a rate of 443 in 1991. 
Based on Levitt’s estimates, this would have translated into a 12 percent decrease in homicides, 
not a 35 percent decrease. Levitt’s revised estimate for the total affect of his 10 factors on 
homicide during the 1973—1991 period would be an increase in homicides of 3 percent, which 
is not far from the actual reported change in the UCR of a positive 5 percent. In other words, 
using aggregated institutionalization data rather than prison data would eliminate Levitt’s 
disparity regarding the change in homicides.   
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PART III:  Implications and Directions 
 
 Rethinking confinement through the lens of institutionalization puts the incarceration 
revolution of the late-twentieth century in a different light. If hospitalization and prison rates are 
aggregated, the United States is only now beginning to reach the levels of institutionalization that 
were commonplace from the mid-1930s to the mid-1950s. Naturally, this tells us nothing about 
the proper amount of confinement in society, nor should it alter our perception or evaluation of 
the incarceration revolution of the late twentieth century. What it does underscore, more than 
anything, is how much institutionalization there was in the 1930s, 40s, 50s, and 60s. Perhaps, 
then, it is the continuity of confinement—and not only the most recent exponential increase in 
imprisonment—that we need to study empirically and explain.   
 One obvious objection is that these are two very different populations. Although there 
may be some overlap at the margin, it is hard to believe that the same people who were 
deinstitutionalized would end up in prison. The continuity thesis is, in this sense, shocking to our 
sensibilities about the “insane” and the “criminal.” This raises the question of the 
interdependence of the two populations, an area that has received significant research attention. 
 In their 1984 study, The Impact of State Mental Hospital Deinstitutionalization on United 
States Prison Populations, 1968—1978, Henry Steadman, John Monahan and their colleagues 
test the degree of reciprocity between the mental health and prison systems in the wake of state 
mental hospital deinstitutionalization. They use both a comparative and longitudinal approach. 
Their study randomly selected a total of 3,897 male prisoners and 2,376 adult male admittees to 
state mental hospitals from six different states, half from 1968 and the other half from 1978. 
They gathered full institutional histories for arrests, imprisonment, and state mental 
hospitalization for each inmate and then compared the system overlap between 1968 and 1978. 
They were able, thus, to measure the extent of cross-institutionalization: the change in the 
number of prisoners with prior mental health contacts, as well as the change in mental health 
patients with criminal records.  
 Regarding the number and proportion of prison admittees with one or more prior mental 
hospitalizations, Steadman and Monahan found significant variation between the six states. 
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Texas experienced a huge increase, California and Iowa an increase as well, but New York, 
Arizona and Massachussetts experienced proportional declines. Naturally, it was a period of 
rapid expansion in the prison population, with prison admissions up 42.4 percent for the six 
states from 1968 to 1978. During that period, the overall number of prisoners in the six states 
with prior hospitalization almost doubled, up 97.3% (Steadman et al. 1984:481 Table 2). 
Consolidating their tables, and calculating total figures, their findings can be summarized as 
follows: 
 
 
  
Number of Prison 
Admittees with Prior 
Hospitalization 
 
Percentage of Prison 
Admittees with Prior 
Hospitalization 
 
 
Expected 1978 
Number Using 
1968 Percentages 
 
Percent 
Difference 
Actual vs. 
Expected 
  
1968 
 
1978 
    
 
  
Change 
 
1968 
 
1978 
  
 
 
NY    741   797        +7.6   12.1     9.3      1,037         -23.1 
CA 1,069 1,777      +66.2    9.5   15.2      1,111        +59.9 
AZ     35     39      +11.4    3.9     2.2          69         -43.5 
TX    18 1,004 +5,477.8    0.3     8.4          35   +2,768.6 
IA    64   153    +139.1    7.7   16.7          71      +115.5 
MA    54   139    +157.4   12.5     9.0        194         -28.4 
 
Total 
 
 
1,981  
 
3,909 
 
 +97.3% 
 
7.7% 
 
10.7% 
     
    2,517 
       
       +55.3% 
 
 
 Because three states (New York, Arizona, and Massachusetts) experienced relative 
declines—that is, taking into account the increase in the prison population—Steadman and 
Monahan conclude from these data that there is little evidence of movement from the mental 
hospitals to prisons: “the percentage of former patients among the ranks of prison admittees 
decreased in as many study states as it increased” (1984: 483). Thus, “little evidence was found 
to support the idea that mental hospital deinstitutionalization was a significant factor in the rise 
of prison populations during th[e] period [1968 to 1978]” (1984: 490).  
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 On the other side of the equation, Steadman and Monahan do find evidence that mental 
hospitals were becoming more “criminal” (1984: 487). Holding constant the changes in total 
mental hospital admissions for the six states—which were down nine percent from 1968 to 
1978—the number of mental hospital admittees with one or more prior arrests increased by an 
average 40.3 percent, and the number with a prior imprisonment increased on average by 60.4 
percent. “In all study states but Iowa, the actual number of hospital admittees with one or more 
prior arrests is substantially higher (from 11.7% to 99.9%) than would be expected from total 
admission trends” (1984: 486). 
 My interpretation of their prison data is less sanguine. Although the state-by-state 
breakdown is even, the aggregated numbers tell a different story. The number of inmates with a 
prior mental hospitalization is more than 50 percent higher than would have been expected given 
the prison growth. To be sure, it does not account for all of the prison expansion. In this sense, 
Steadman and Monahan are undoubtedly right: the evidence does not show that 
deinstitutionalization explains the prison explosion. It does not establish direct transfer from the 
asylum to the penitentiary. But there may be significant overlap and, over time, more 
substitution. The proportion has increase by more than half. It is consistent at least with some 
interdependence. The real question is, how much?6   
 Steven Raphael (1999) tackles this question using an econometric model in his paper The 
Deinstitutionalization of the Mentally Ill and Growth in the U.S. Prison Populations: 1971 to 
1996. Raphael tests for a relationship between mental hospitalization and prison populations 
using state-level data for the period 1971 to 1996. And what he finds, across his six different 
models, is that the mental hospitalization rate has a statistically significant and robust negative 
effect on prison rates. Moreover, the magnitude of the effect is large and ranges from a low of 7 
to a high of a 2 person decline in mental hospitalization resulting in a one person increase in the 
prison rate. Translated into actual population numbers, Raphael’s findings suggest that 
deinstitutionalization from 1971 to 1996 resulted in between 48,000 and 148,000 additional state 
prisoners in 1996, which, according to Raphael, “accounts for 4.5 to 14 percent of the total 
 
6  Another problem with their analysis is that the reduction in mental health care starting in the 1960s may itself 
reduce the number of mental health contacts for individuals who end up in prison. Measuring the interdependence of 
the two populations based on prior mental hospitalization will not capture mental illness properly if there is less and 
less care that leaves traces on the general population. 
 
1/28/2006 Confinement in the United States 32 
 
 
prison population for this year and for roughly 28 to 86 percent of prison inmates suffering from 
mental illness” (Raphael 1999: *12). What we also know is that, at the close of the twentieth 
century, there was a high level of mentally ill offenders in prisons and jails in the United 
States—288,000 in 1998—representing 16 percent of jail and state prison inmates (Ditton 1999; 
Raphael 1999).     
 Back to Social Theory 
 The problem with these empirical analyses, though, is that again they take too literally the 
official categories of the “mentally ill” and of the “criminal.” The diagnosis and documentation 
of mental illness needs to be problematized, as does the guilty verdict. The empirical studies put 
too much credence in the official labels. These categories are not natural and do not have 
independent validity and objective signification. The question is not, “How many people with 
mental illness are in the criminal justice system?” Rather, the question should be, “Has the 
criminal justice system caught in its wider net the type of people at the margin of society—the 
class of deviants from predominant social norms—who used to be caught up in the asylum and 
mental hospital?” The real challenge is to deconstruct both the categories of the “insane” and of 
the “criminal” simultaneously.  
 The first is easy. With regard to the asylum, we are all constructivists today. We all 
accept the claim that criminality was medicalized in the early twentieth century. As Liska and 
Markowitz suggest, correctly, “During the first half of the 20th century, psychiatrists medicalized 
social problems, successfully arguing that the cause of many social problems, like crime, lies in 
the psychological malfunctioning of people and that the solution lies in their treatment by 
medical specialists in treatment centers” (1999: 1747). Or as William Gronfein explains: 
 
 In Goffman’s words (1961: 352), “part of the official mandate of the public 
mental hospital is to protect the community from the danger and nuisance of certain kinds 
of misconduct.” Publicly supported insane asylums represented an uneasy, albeit 
surprisingly successful, marriage between asylum and prison, a fact that was of particular 
importance in contributing to their long term growth. (Gronfein 1985: 194) 
 
 On this, we all agree: the category of the “insane” was created in modern times to capture 
the deviant and marginal. In order to make sense of the larger trend in institutionalization, we 
need to view the “criminal” through the same prism. Is it possible that the category of the 
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present-day criminal does the same work that used to be done by the category of the insane? 
Might it capture the same class of norm violators, the same kind of deviants?  
 Certainly there are important demographic differences. The gender distribution, for 
instance, was far more even in mental hospitals than in prisons. In 1966, for example, there were 
560,548 first time admissions to mental hospitals of which 310,810 (or 55.4 percent) were male 
and 249,738 (or 44.6 percent) were female (U.S. Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1967 
Mental Health Facilities Report (1969)). In contrast, new admittees to state and federal prison 
were consistently 95 percent male throughout the twentieth century (Cahalan 1986: 66). There 
were also sharp differences in racial and age compositions—which I discuss next. But within the 
demographic group—within the set of male inmates, for instance—could the categories have 
served the same function, at least roughly?  Steadman and Monahan gesture at this in their study, 
suggesting that the relationship between the mental health and prison systems may be indirect, 
“mediated by community reaction towards all types of socially marginal groups when the 
societal tolerance level for deviance is exceeded” (Steadman et al. 1984). This is one direction to 
pursue.   
 And how does race figure into the equation, since it is such an important part of the 
incarceration expansion—since the prison has become, as Loic Wacquant suggests, the last of 
our peculiar institutions (Wacquant 2001)? There is some evidence to suggest that the proportion 
of minorities in mental hospitals was increasing during deinstitutionalization. From 1968 to 
1978, for instance, there was already a demographic shift among mental hospital admittees. In 
Steadman and Monahan’s data, for instance, the proportion of non-whites increased from 18.3 
percent in 1968 to 31.7 percent in 1978:  “across the six states studied, the mean age at hospital 
admission decreased from 39.1 in 1968 to 33.3 by 1978. The percentage of whites among 
admitted patients also decreased, from 81.7% in 1968 to 68.3% in 1978” (1984: 479). There was 
less stark a shift in prison admissions in their data, though the direction of change was the same: 
“Across the six states, the mean age of prison admittees was 29.0 in 1968 and 28.1 in 1978. The 
percentage of whites among prison admittees was also relatively stable, decreasing only from 
57.6% in 1968 to 52.3% in 1978” (Steadman et al. 1984: 479). 
 At the national level, though, the racial shift in prison admissions began well before 
1968. In fact, throughout the twentieth century, African-Americans have represented a 
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consistently increasing proportion of the state and federal prison population. Since 1926, the year 
the federal government began collecting data on correctional populations, the proportion of 
African-Americans newly admitted to state prisons has increased steadily from 23.1 percent in 
1926 to 45.8 percent in 1982. It reached 51.8 percent in 1991, and stood at 47 percent in 1997.  
This trend is illustrated in Figure 5 below: 
 
 
FIGURE 5:  Admissions to State Prisons
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 In 1978, African-Americans represented 42.6 of newly admitted inmates in state prisons.  
That same year, minorities represented 31.7 percent of newly admitted patients in mental 
hospitals—up from 18.3 percent in 1968. Is it possible that, as the population in mental hospitals 
became increasingly African-American and young, our society gravitated toward the prison 
rather than the mental hospital as the proper way to deal with at-risk populations? This too would 
require further investigation.  
 Overall, it is the differences and the gradual changes in the demographic composition of 
the two populations that stick out. The mental hospitalization population was far more evenly 
distributed along gender lines, was an older population, and tended to be more white. But the 
demographic distributions changed over time, and this gradual change calls for explanation. It 
also significantly affects the interpretation of a possible relationship between institutionalization 
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and homicide. After all, the mental hospital population was largely female, and statistically 
women are far less likely to be violent offenders. How then could there be any continuity in the 
effect on serious violent crime? And if there is indeed a continuing effect, might that suggest that 
the present prison population also includes a sizeable portion of low-risk offenders? In other 
words, have the women in the mental hospitalization populations been replaced by non-violent 
drug offenders in the prison populations? Also, if there is indeed a relationship, does it suggest 
that the type of institutionalization doesn’t matter: regardless of whether we use mental hospitals 
or prisons, we achieve the same result. If so, does this militate in favor of returning to a 
medicalized model?   
 
Conclusion 
 Michel Foucault writes, in Madness and Civilization, that “There must have formed, 
silently and doubtless over the course of many years, a social sensibility, common to European 
culture, that suddenly began to manifest itself in the second half of the seventeenth century; it 
was this sensibility that suddenly isolated the category destined to populate the places of 
confinement. To inhabit the reaches long since abandoned by the lepers, they chose a group that 
to our eyes is strangely mixed and confused. But what is for us merely an undifferentiated 
sensibility must have been, for those living in the classical age, a clearly articulated perception” 
(1965: 45).  
 To our eyes, the categories of “mental illness” and “criminality”—and the corresponding 
populations of the mental hospital and the prison—seem so distinct, so different, so particular. 
With the exception of the 16 percent or more prison inmates who are suffering from mental 
illness, it seems to many of us so wrong and confused to mix the categories. It seems almost 
insulting to aggregate the two populations into one variable. But is it? Will later generations 
question our own inability to see and take into account the continuity of spatial exclusion and 
confinement? Will they question our own balkanization of research on social control? Will they 
question our categories? 
 Of course, the story may be even more complicated. Perhaps I have not even begun to 
scratch the surface of institutionalization. After all, Goffman included in the set of total 
institutions the army. Should we add the armed forces as part of our institutionalization count? 
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Also, in the mental health area, many of the persons who were deinstitutionalized moved into 
private facilities. As William Gronfein writes, “many former patients have been 
‘transinstitutionalized’ rather than deinstitutionalized, moving from state-supported asylums to 
privately run nursing homes or board-and-care homes” (1985: 193).7 Should we include nursing 
homes as well? How exactly should we define institutionalization? Where do we place the 
contour of the total institution?   
 
 
 
 
 
 
7  Gerald Grob notes that “much of the decline in the number of patients in mental hospitals was more apparent than 
real. During the 1960s the number of mental patients in chronic nursing homes rose precipitously as states attempted 
to reduce their expenditures by taking advantage of new federal programs” (Grob 1983: 317). So, for instance, 
whereas mental hospital populations decreased sharply and rapidly from over 500,000 in 1963 to under 370,000 six 
years later in 1970, “the number of individuals with mental disorders in chronic nursing homes increased from 
221,721 to 426,712 (of which 367,586 were aged sixty-five or older)” (Grob 1983: 317). 
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Appendix 
 
A Note on Jail Data and their Effect 
 
 There are no reliable statistics on jail populations—in most cases, no data at all—for the 
period before 1970. That is the year that the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration 
(LEAA) conducted the first census of jails (Cahalan 1986:73 and Table 4-1 at p. 76). Prior to 
that, there were decennial Census Bureau counts for 1880, 1890, 1940, 1950, and 1960, but even 
those Census counts are not reliable. So for instance, in 1970, the Census reported 129,189 
inmates in jail, whereas the first Department of Justice LEAA count that same year reported 
160,863 inmates in jail—24.5% higher than the Census count.  
 There are a number of reasons for the underreporting and non-reporting of jail inmates. 
Jails are jurisdictionally at the municipal and county level and, as a result, are much more 
difficult to survey than, for instance, federal prisons. In addition, between 1904 and at least 1940, 
the Census only counted jail inmates who were sentenced. The more thorough 1923 special 
report, “Prisoners, 1923,” also excluded inmates who were not sentenced, and in addition 
omitted certain jails that were believed not to contain sentenced jail inmates. So all the data, 
including the 1933 “County and City Jails” report, excluded jail inmates who had not been 
sentenced yet (Cahalan 1986: 73).  
 From 1940 to 1950, according to the Census count, the jail population was decreasing, 
down almost 13,000 or 13% from 99,249 in 1940 to 86,492 in 1950. Again, though, the 1970 
LEAA count and comparison to the 1970 Census count suggests that these number may have 
been off by as much as 25 percent.  
 If we make very conservative assumptions and assume (1) that the jail population stayed 
flat from 1928 to 1940 (recall, it was dropping from 1940 to 1950) and (2) that the Census counts 
were valid (recall that they are at least 25 percent off), and we interpolate linearly the missing 
data (we only have three unreliable years, 1940, 1950, and 1960, for the 42 year period 1928 to 
1970), then we obtain data that we can use to add to the institutionalization number.  
 For jail numbers, I was able to obtain historical data for decennial years (1940, 1950, 
1960, 1970, and 1980) as well as 1933, 1972, 1978, 1982 and 1983 from Cahalan (1986). For 
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data since 1983, data derived from the Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics, and yearly 
Prison and Jail Inmates and Prisoners publications of the Bureau of Justice Statistics. For 
missing data, I have linearly interpolated the data.  
 When I run a model, it reduces the effect, but not by that much. The result are 
summarized here:  
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Appendix Table 1 
 
Adding Jail Rate to Institutionalization in Studying the Incarceration-Crime Nexus: 
Prais-Winsten Autocorrelation Adjustment at Lag 1 (AR1) Regression Results 
 
Dependent variable = Homicide Rates, 1928—2000 
 
Explanatory 
variables: 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 
Institutionalization 
plus Jail Rate: 
 
Prais coefficient 
Standard error 
P value 
 
 
 
 
-.806*** 
(.235)) 
0.001 
 
 
 
 
-.815*** 
(.231) 
0.001 
 
 
 
-.774** 
(.301) 
0.012 
 
 
 
-.78*** 
(.296) 
0.009 
 
 
 
-.833*** 
(.274) 
0.004 
 
 
 
-1.15*** 
(.378) 
0.004 
 
Unemployment: 
 
Prais coefficient 
Standard error 
P value 
 
  
 
 
.047* 
(.025) 
0.061 
  
 
 
.047* 
(.025 
0.064 
  
 
 
.159 
(.106) 
0.129 
 
Proportion 15 - 24: 
 
Prais coefficient 
Standard error 
P value 
  
   
 
 
-.0295 
(.172) 
0.864 
 
 
 
 
.015 
(.169) 
0.931 
  
 
 
-.444* 
(.251) 
0.086 
Poverty: 
 
Prais coefficient 
Standard error 
P value 
 
 
     
 
-.02 
(.102) 
0.845 
 
 
-.258** 
(.114) 
0.030 
Durbin-Watson 
statistic pre-Prais-
Winsten 
0.081 0.098 0.081 0.129 0.203 0.379 
Durbin-Watson 
statistic post-Prais-
Winsten 
1.274 1.396 1.269 1.393 1.017 1.183 
OLS R-squared 0.351 0.437 0.352 0.484 0.565 0.821 
N 73 73 73 73 42 42 
* = statistically significant at 10 percent cutoff. ** = 5 percent cutoff. *** = 1 percent cutoff. 
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